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The Healthy Fright of Losing a Good One for a Bad One 
 
In this paper we study the effect of different degrees of employment protection on 
absenteeism, paying attention to differences between workers moving from protected jobs to 
insecure jobs, on the one hand, and workers moving from insecure to secure jobs, on the 
other hand. Using a large representative sample of Italian workers, we show that workers’ 
reaction in terms of sickness leave is not symmetric: losing protection (bad news) is more 
effective than gaining it (good news). We claim that this asymmetry is consistent with the 
behavior of financial markets responding to good and bad news. In our case, workers react in 
a more prudential way to improvements in their employment status (“wait and see” strategy), 
while they do immediately adjust to worsening job security by showing off healthy behavior. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Workers’ health status is not perfectly observable by employers. The sickness 
insurance system, or the employer, may provide for restrictions and obligations in order 
to claim sick leave, but absence is ultimately a worker decision. Several factors affect 
this decision: the worker’s actual health status, her value for leisure, job satisfaction, as 
opposed to work stress and dissatisfaction, and incentives. 
Incentives may change. Along her active life, a worker may experience several 
jobs,  characterized  by  different  working  conditions,  complexity,  co-workers  and 
protection  from  firing.  Ceteris  paribus,  workers  covered  by  higher  employment 
protection  are  less  exposed  to  the  threat  of  losing  their  job  when  caught  shirking, 
therefore  they  have  higher  incentive  to  report  as  sick.  Then,  when  the  employment 
contract changes, worker behavior should also change. 
We  show  that  workers’  reaction  is  not  symmetric:  losing  protection  is  more 
effective than gaining it. 
A  bunch  of  papers  already  studied  the  relationship  between  employment 
protection and workers’ effort, measured in terms of absence from work. Lindbeck et al. 
(2006) and Olsson (2009) exploit a natural experiment in Sweden to estimate the effect 
of lowering employment protection on sickness absence. Ichino and Riphahn (2004, 
2005) find that absenteeism increases when the worker get entitled to higher protection. 
Scoppa (2010) experiments with several measures of job security and consistently find a 
negative  correlation  between  security  and  absence  due  to  sickness.  Among  these 
studies,  only  Ichino  and  Riphahn  (2005)  clearly  rule  out  any  composition  effect  by 
analyzing the same pool of workers before and after the probationary  period. Their 
estimates  show  a  significant  increases  in  absence  once  employment  protection  is 
granted. Nevertheless, it is difficult to generalize those findings. First, they rely on a 
specific case study, employees in a large Italian bank. Second, these workers have all 
being  hired  under  permanent  contracts,  subject  to  a  short  probationary  period.  The 
incentives faced by this selected sample are likely to be very different from those faced 
by a representative temporary workers, who may or may not be renewed as permanent. 
We present empirical evidence based on a large representative sample of Italian 
workers  employed  in  the  private  sector,  WHIP
1,  drawn  from  administrative  data. 
Around  370,000  individuals  are  followed  from  1985  to  2004  and,  since  1998,  the 
                                                 
1 Worker Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) is  a database of  individual work histories, based on Inps (Italian 
Social Insurance Institute) administrative data. information about the contract type is provided.
2 Controlling for individual and firm 
characteristics, we can identify the effect of different degrees of employment protection 
on absenteeism. Furthermore, we depart from existing literature because, by exploiting 
the  panel  dimension  of  the  data,  we  can  assess  the  different  magnitudes  of  the 
employment protection effect for workers moving from safe jobs – permanent contract – 
to insecure jobs – fixed-term and temporary agency employment arrangements – with 
respect to workers changing from insecurity to security. 
Overall, the likelihood to experience a period of sickness is significantly lower for 
temporary  workers  but  with  remarkable  differences.  Individuals  formerly  employed 
under a temporary contract, do not change their absence rate when they get a permanent 
contract.  Instead,  permanent  workers  significantly  reduce  absence  when  they  lose 
employment  protection.  This  suggests  that  individuals  react  in  a  different  way  to 
improvement in their working conditions, with respect to worsening.  
We then explore whether this asymmetric behavior is due to a slow adjustment to 
the new job. Regressions including lags in the contract type show that this is actually 
the  case  for  workers  gaining  employment  protection,  while  those  loosing  it  adjust 
immediately. This is in line with the literature on bad and good news in the financial 
market. Good news are met with a prudential behavior and small, lagged movements in 
the outcome variable. Instead, bad news induce an immediate and large reaction. 
The paper is organized as follow. In Section 2 we summarize the literature on 
workers  absenteeism.  Data  are  described  in  Section  3.  In  Section  4  we  present  our 
analysis of the effect of job security on absence. The asymmetric results are discussed in 






Both  the  theoretical  and  the  empirical  literature  on  workers'  absenteeism  have 
mainly focused on labor supply aspects. The analysis has been based on the standard 
labour supply model in which the worker, given her health status and preferences for 
leisure, chooses either to work or to claim sick leave. The resulting (absence) behavior 
is explained by (i) worker’s characteristics -- such as age, gender, marital status, etc. -- 
                                                 
2 Before 1998, most of the contracts were permanent in Italy and seasonal and fixed-term arrangements 
were allowed only in restrictive circumstances. that determines the health status and the marginal utility of leisure of the worker; (ii) 
contractual arrangements – like working hours, wage -- and (iii) economic incentives -- 
sickness insurance system -- that affect the cost of absence. 
A  common  finding  in  the  empirical  studies  is  that  females  and  older  workers 
exhibit higher sickness rates than males and young workers. Higher wages provide an 
effective  incentive  to  work,  while  longer  working  hours  are  associated  with  higher 
absenteeism (Barmby et al. 2004) On the other side, flexible working-time and part-
time arrangements decrease sickness absence (Lusinyan and Bonato, 2007). 
Several  papers  show  that  absenteeism  is  very  sensitive  to  the  generosity  and 
duration  of  sickness  benefits.  (Johansson  and  Palme,  1996;  Barmby  et  al.  2002; 
Bergendorff et al. 2004; Lusinyan and Bonato 2007). 
The threat of being fired can act as a worker discipline device. As a matter of fact, 
the empirical evidence suggests a negative correlation between the unemployment rate 
and absenteeism rate (Leigh, 1985; Arai and Skogman Thoursie, 2005). Furthermore, 
higher employment protection is associated with higher absenteeism, since it decreases 
the expected cost of absence for the worker.  
A theoretical model of workers’ absence and employment protection has been 
proposed  by  Ichino  and  Muehlheusser  (2008)  and  empirically  tested  in  Ichino  and 
Riphahn  (2004,  2005).  Further  evidence  in  support  of  the  discipline  device  of  low 
protection is provided by Lindbeck et al. (2006) and Olsson (2009), for Sweden, and 
Scoppa (2010), for Italy.  
 
 
3. Data description 
 
The  Worker  Histories  Italian  Panel  (WHIP)  is  a  database  of  individual  work 
histories,  based  on  INPS  (Italian  Social  Insurance  Institute)  administrative  archives. 
INPS cover all the workers employed in the private sector and self-employed. WHIP 
consists  of  a  large  representative  sample  of  around  370,000  individuals,  who  are 
followed  from  1985  to  2004.  For  each  of  these  people  the  main  episodes  of  their 
working  careers  are  observed.  Furthermore,  workers  data  are  linked  with  firm 
characteristics taken from the INPS Firm Archive. 
Each  worker  may  be  associated  with  more  than  one  employment  relationship 
within the same year. In every record we observe worker’s age, gender and region of birth, contract type (from 1998 onwards), the beginning and end of the employment 
spell, the number of paid working days, the yearly gross wage, whether the worker has 
been on sick leave, maternity leave or temporary lay-off (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, 
CIG,  which  is  a  sort  of  Wage  Guarantee  Fund).  Firm  information  includes  size, 
industry, location of the head office and of the workplace. 
Since we are interested in the effect of employment protection on absence due to 
illness, we exclude self-employed from the analysis and concentrate on employees. We 
also exclude those who have been absent during the year due to CIG or maternity, top 
executives,
3 and workers older than 54.
4 Firms information is available only until 2002, 
therefore the sample used in the analysis cover the period 1998-2002. In the end, we are 
left with more than 390,000 individual-year observations. 
For each observation we can construct two absence indicators: 
·  sick: whether the individual had any absence due to illness during the 
year 
·  absence_rate: number of lost working days divided by the number of 
working days during the year 
The number of lost working days is constructed using the information about the 
length  of  the  employment  spell  and  the  number  of  paid  working  days.  When  the 
sickness benefit is paid by the national insurance system, those days are not included 
among paid working days.
5 
Sickness absence varies greatly in the sample. Most of the workers are never sick, 
but some of them display a large number of absent days. The overall standard deviations 
is over 4% (10 days over a full working year), while the average is lower than 1% (2 
days over a full working year). The average absenteeism rate is increasing with age and 
decreasing with wage, but due to the large variability, unconditional differences are not 
                                                 
3 Top executives receive sickness benefits not from the national insurance system, but from the employer. 
Therefore the sickness spells are not necessarily recorded in administrative data. 
4 There are several reasons to exclude older workers. First, they are less likely to be employed under a 
temporary arrangement and to change job; therefore they provide less information about the effect of the 
contract type. Second, the pattern of sickness absence changes across age groups and is peculiar for the 
old. Older workers are more likely to be sick due to health problem, but, on the other side, absence may 
be lower since they are a selected sample of individuals who are particularly attached to their job, since 
they are still at work eventhough they could benefit from pension (The retirement age is currently set at 
66 and 61 years for males and females, respectively, but it used to be lower and it was not unusual to get 
retired around 50). 
5 In practice, the national insurance system pays 50% of the base salary for every days on sick leave 
exceeding the third day, and collective agreements often provide for the employer to compensate the 
worker  up  to  100%  the  base  wage,  including  the  waiting  period.  Therefore  the  absence_rate 
underestimate the true incidence of absenteeism. statistically significant. Nor a clear correlation with the employment contract is evident 
in the data (Table A.1). 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
As  a  preliminary  analysis,  we  estimate  the  probability  of  being  absent  due  to 
illness in a given year using the dummy sick. This indicator is less informative than 
absence_rate, since it does not discriminate between workers with low and high 
absenteeism. Nevertheless, probit estimates clearly show that workers under temporary 
employment arrangements– seasonal jobs, fixed-term  and temporary agency employees 
– are less likely to be on sick leave. 
The marginal effects of the contract type, with respect to the permanent contract, 
are reported in Table 1 for different samples: (i) all workers, (ii) workers who changed 
employment  contract  from  a  temporary  one  to  a  permanent  one  in  two  consecutive 
years,  (iii)  workers  who  changed  employment  contract  from  a  permanent  one  to  a 
temporary  one.
6  We  control  for  workers’  characteristics  (gender,  age,  age  squared, 
region of birth), qualification, log monthly wage, length of the employment spell and 
length squared, firm size, industry, workplace location, and year dummies.  
In the upper panel of Table 1, the full sample is considered. The likelihood to be 
absent with respect to permanent workers, is 6.1 percentage points lower for seasonal 
workers; 3.3 percentage points lower for employees on fixed-term contracts; and 5.4 
percentage points lower for temporary agency workers. Columns (2) and (3) replicate 
the  estimates  after  restricting  the  sample  to  employment  spells  of  at  least  1  and  2 
months, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) refer to the sample of males and females. The 
estimated effects of the contracts are basically unchanged. 
The negative effect of temporary employment is confirmed in the lower panels. 
Comparing the second panel – from insecure jobs to secure jobs – with the third panel – 
from secure jobs to unsecure jobs – we find no clear cut evidence of asymmetry. 
 
                                                 
6 See the transition matrix in Table A.3. Table  1.  Probit  estimates  for  the  probability  of  being  absent  due  to  illness  – 
marginal effects 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
    >1month  >2month  M  F 
                 
Seasonal  -0.061***  -0.065***  -0.070***  -0.064***  -0.052*** 
  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.004] 
Fixed-term  -0.033***  -0.033***  -0.035***  -0.026***  -0.041*** 
  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Temporary agency  -0.054***  -0.057***  -0.060***  -0.058***  -0.044*** 
  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.007] 
           
Observations  258,476  251,515  242,305  177,144  80,884 
           
Sample: temporary to permanent       
           
Seasonal  -0.048***  -0.052***  -0.054* **  -0.052***  -0.060*** 
  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.013] 
Fixed-term  -0.030***  -0.032***  -0.034***  -0.032***  -0.021*** 
  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.005]  [0.007] 
Temporary agency  -0.036***  -0.042***  -0.046***  -0.043***  -0.031 
  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.015]  [0.014]  [0.020] 
           
Observations  25,130  24,303  23,117  24,179  16,396 
           
Sample: permanent to temporary     
           
Seasonal  -0.055***  -0.060***  -0.063***  -0.061***  -0.070*** 
  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.012] 
Fixed-term  -0.020***  -0.022***  -0.024***  -0.022***  -0.023*** 
  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.007] 
Temporary agency  -0.041***  -0.045***  -0.051***  -0.046***  -0.048*** 
  [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.014]  [0.013]  [0.017] 
           
Observations  19,757  18,926  17,764  18,772  13,226 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates, respectively, statistical significance at 1, 6, 10 percent level. 
Estimates are obtained using Probit model. All regressions control for: workers’ characteristics (gender, 
age, age squared, region of birth), qualification, log monthly wage, length of the employment spell and 
length  squared,  firm  size,  industry,  workplace  location,  and  year  dummies.  The  marginal  effects  are 
computed at average values of the covariates.  
In column (2), all employment relationships  shorter than  1  month are excluded  from  the sample. In 
column  (3),  all  employment  relationships  shorter  than  2  month  are  excluded.    Column  (4)  and  (5) 
consider only males and females, respectively. 
 
Instead,  asymmetry  is  evident  in  the  effect  of  the  employment  contract  on 
absence_rate. 
Estimates are reported in Table 2 for the same samples employed in the probit 
regressions. The first column shows the results of pooled OLS regression. Columns (2) 
to (9) apply a fixed effect estimator. 
 Table  2.  Regressions  on  absence  ratem  (percentage  points)  –  the  effect  of  the 
contract type. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (8)  (9) 
  OLS  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE 
      >1m  >2m  M  F 
              
Seasonal  -0.557***  -0.471***  -0.495***  -0.488***  -0.569***  -0.352* 
  [0.076]  [0.126]  [0.131]  [0.142]  [0.164]  [0.197] 
Fixed-term  -0.353***  -0.307***  -0.276***  -0.206***  -0.284***  -0.342*** 
  [0.041]  [0.059]  [0.061]  [0.064]  [0.073]  [0.101] 
Temporary agency  -0.591***  -0.377**  -0.265  -0.118  -0.481**  -0.164 
  [0.097]  [0.160]  [0.173]  [0.188]  [0.198]  [0.275] 
             
Observations  254,482  254,834  247,893  238,816  174,518  80,316 
Number of ind.    76,814  74,737  71,987  50,347  26,467 
             
Sample: temporary to permanent     
             
Seasonal  -0.315*  -0.336  -0.358  -0.227  -0.343  -0.323 
  [0.177]  [0.217]  [0.227]  [0.240]  [0.296]  [0.307] 
Fixed-term  -0.153*  -0.126  -0.129  -0.068  -0.121  -0.148 
  [0.082]  [0.088]  [0.091]  [0.094]  [0.116]  [0.134] 
Temporary agency  -0.293  -0.159  -0.002  -0.262  -0.325  0.206 
  [0.231]  [0.314]  [0.336]  [0.357]  [0.423]  [0.457] 
             
Observations  24,586  24,596  23,775  22,619  16,000  8,596 
Number of ind.    6,179  6,161  6,101  3,972  2,207 
             
Sample: permanent to  temporary     
             
Seasonal  -0.394**  -0.284  -0.326  -0.292  -0.549*  0.134 
  [0.204]  [0.255]  [0.267]  [0.290]  [0.340]  [0.377] 
Fixed-term  -0.030  -0.205**  -0.221**  -0.191*  -0.217  -0.206 
  [0.099]  [0.109]  [0.113]  [0.118]  [0.137]  [0.179] 
Temporary agency  -0.002  0.038  0.076  -0.128  -0.291  0.757 
  [0.275]  [0.347]  [0.372]  [0.403]  [0.443]  [0.560] 
             
Observations  19,241  19,250  18,422  17,282  12,854  6,396 
Number of ind.    4,849  4,830  4,760  3,191  1,658 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates, respectively, statistical significance at 1, 6, 10 percent level. 
All  regressions  control  for:  workers’  characteristics  (gender,  age,  age  squared,  region  of  birth), 
qualification, log monthly wage, length of the employment spell and length squared, firm size, industry, 
workplace  location,  and  year  dummies.  The  marginal  effects  are  computed  at  average  values  of  the 
covariates.  
Estimates in column (1) are obtained using pooled OLS, all the other columns use FE methods. In column 
(3), all employment relationships shorter than 1 month are excluded from the sample. In column (4), all 
employment relationships shorter than 2 month are excluded.  Column (5) and (6) consider only males 
and females, respectively. 
 
Again, less protected workers are associated with lower absenteeism. In the full 
sample,  using  FE  (Col.  2)  seasonal  workers’  absence  rate  is  0.47  p.p.  lower  than permanent workers, the reduction is 0.31 p.p. for fixed-term contracts and 0.38 p.p. for 
temporary agency employee.  
Results  change  dramatically  in  the  lower  panels.  The  absence  rate  does  not 
significantly  change  for  workers  moving  from  unprotected  contracts  to  protected 
contracts (panel 2). Instead, formerly permanent workers significantly reduce absence 





Our  main  results  only  partly  confirm  the  discipline  device  effect  of  low 
employment  protection  found  in  the  literature.  Although  workers  employed  under 
temporary contracts display lower absence, the same worker does not respond in the 
same way to a decrease or to an increase in job security. A permanent worker who loses 
her job for an unprotected one, adjusts her behavior by significantly reducing absence. 
Instead, gaining a protected job does not imply higher absences. 
The former result is in line with Lindbeck et al. (2006) and Olsson (2009). The 
lowering of employment protection makes the threat of dismissal more credible and, 
therefore, absence cost increases. 
The latter result apparently contradicts Ichino and Riphahn (2005). They show 
that employees increase absenteeism as soon as the probationary period ends and they 
get entitled to  full employment protection.  On the contrary,  we  find that temporary 
workers do not change their behavior once they get a permanent contract.  
A possible explanation is that temporary workers face different incentives than 
workers hired under a permanent contract, with a probationary period. The formers have 
a relatively lower probability to get renewed as permanent, hence the expected benefit 
from low shirking is limited. In our sample, among the temporary workers who have 
been employed in two consecutive years, only 15% got a permanent job.
7 Instead, in 
Ichino and Riphahn sample, out of 895 employees, only 37 are fired or quit during the 
probationary period, i.e. 96% of them are continued, hence refraining from shirking is 
more valuable. 
The  small  continuation  probability  can  account  for  the  irrelevance  of  the 
employment contract for the subgroup of workers moving from unsecure to secure jobs, 
                                                 
7 The percentage of conversion to permanent contract would be even smaller if we were considering also 
those temporary workers who moved into unemployment. but  it  cannot  explain  the  high  reaction  of  permanent  workers  losing  their  job  for  a 
temporary one. They should also face low incentives to reduce shirking and keep their 
former behavior. But we consistently estimate a large adjustment. Why? 
Let’s rephrase the question. Getting a permanent job when it is not very likely is a 
good news; losing a protected job is also not very likely and can be considered a bad 
news. Do individuals react more to bad news than to good news? Yes, they do. 
This puzzle has been well documented in the finance literature (e.g. McQueen et 
al.,  1996).  Stocks  react  slowly  to  good  news,  while  they  immediately  discount  bad 
news. If this is true for workers as well, then we would observed a lagged effect of the 
good news – getting a permanent contract after a temporary employment – but no lags 
in bad news – losing a permanent contract for a temporary one. 
To test this hypothesis, we replicate regressions in Table 2 adding lags in the 
contract type. The sample sizes get smaller, since we require the worker to be employed 
in a temporary (permanent) job followed by two consecutive years under a permanent 
(temporary) contract. This is particularly restrictive for those changing from permanent 
to temporary jobs. Results are depicted in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Regression on absence rate – contemporaneous and lagged effect of good 
and bad news 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  OLS  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE 
      >1m  >2m  M  F 
                    
Sample: temporary to permanent (good news)     
             
Seasonal  -0.853**  -0.715*  -0.510  -0.425  -0.866*  -0.445 
  [0.360]  [0.393]  [0.408]  [0.415]  [0.514]  [0.594] 
Fixed-term  -0.201  -0.107  -0.135  -0.093  -0.113  -0.128 
  [0.135]  [0.147]  [0.149]  [0.149]  [0.185]  [0.239] 
Temporary agency  -1.061**  -0.854*  -0.687  -0.706  -0.471  -1.715** 
  [0.412]  [0.513]  [0.543]  [0.549]  [0.667]  [0.789] 
L.Seasonal  -0.340  -0.300  -0.188  -0.406  -0.715*  0.463 
  [0.252]  [0.283]  [0.290]  [0.296]  [0.373]  [0.420] 
L.Fixed-term  -0.223**  -0.211*  -0.238**  -0.228**  -0.253*  -0.138 
  [0.102]  [0.110]  [0.111]  [0.111]  [0.140]  [0.175] 
L.Temporary agency  -0.580**  -0.627*  -0.683**  -0.803**  -1.018**  0.087 
  [0.292]  [0.333]  [0.339]  [0.336]  [0.437]  [0.494] 
             
Observations  18,388  18,391  18,196  17,934  12,656  5,735 
Number of ind.     5,322  5,319  5,309  3,615  1,707 
             Sample: permanent to temporary (bad news)       
             
Seasonal  -0.539**  -0.471  -0.581  -0.645  -0.716  -0.036 
  [0.266]  [0.378]  [0.398]  [0.419]  [0.480]  [0.622] 
Fixed-term  -0.010  -0.244  -0.277  -0.206  -0.227  -0.358 
  [0.140]  [0.170]  [0.176]  [0.182]  [0.207]  [0.301] 
Temporary agency  -0.259  -0.040  0.025  -0.229  -0.530  0.996 
  [0.363]  [0.514]  [0.549]  [0.588]  [0.631]  [0.894] 
L.Seasonal  0.352  0.423  0.344  0.310  0.200  0.642 
  [0.298]  [0.350]  [0.365]  [0.381]  [0.459]  [0.540] 
L.Fixed-term  0.034  -0.016  -0.010  0.024  0.159  -0.354 
  [0.150]  [0.179]  [0.187]  [0.195]  [0.227]  [0.294] 
L.Temporary agency  0.236  0.202  0.166  0.301  -0.050  0.805 
  [0.359]  [0.431]  [0.452]  [0.472]  [0.524]  [0.768] 
             
Observations  10,150  10,154  9,743  9,168  6,696  3,458 
Number of ind.     3,613  3,525  3,406  2,319  1,294 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. 
 
Consistently  with  the  previous  results,  the  immediate  reaction  of  workers 
receiving good news is not significant, and only marginally significant in Col (2). Also 
the lagged effect of seasonal contract is not significant, but having been employed as a 
fixed-term  worker  or  temporary  agency  employee  has  a  large  negative  impact, 
significant at 5% level, in the year following the contract conversion, the effect being 
larger for males. This is coherent with our prediction of slow adjustment to good news. 
The second panel of Table 3 shows that bad news do not show any lagged effect. 
Compared to Table 2, the on impact effect is not significant either, probably due to the 
sample limitation.
8 
Workers do adjust their behavior to changes in employment protection, but at a 
different pace depending on the sign of the change. Individuals respond to good shocks 
in a prudential way (“wait and see”). Instead, bad shocks induce an immediate and large 
reaction.  Unlucky  workers  cope  with  the  worst  scenario  by  showing  off  healthy 
behavior, they make the best of a bad bargain. 
 
                                                 




This paper was aimed at studying the effect of different degrees of employment 
protection  on  absenteeism,  paying  attention  to  differences  between  workers  moving 
from safe jobs – permanent contract – to insecure jobs – fixed-term and temporary 
agency employment arrangements – with respect to workers changing from insecurity to 
security. 
Using a large representative sample of Italian workers, we show that the deterring 
effect of holding a temporary contract is mainly ascribable to individuals losing job 
protection, while those gaining permanent protected jobs do not seem to modify their 
absence behavior. We explain this asymmetry by arguing that workers may react in a 
more  prudential  way  to  improvements  in  their  working  conditions  (“wait  and  see” 
strategy), while they adjust immediately as they get worse. Our estimates support the 
hyphotesis of slow adjustment to improvements and fast adjustment to worsening. 
The asymmetric behavior of individuals facing good news versus bad news is 
not  a  novelty  in  economics.  This  puzzle  has  been  well  documented  in  the  finance 
literature. Good news are met with a prudential behavior and small, lagged movements 
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 Appendix 
 
Table A.1 Descriptive statistics: absence rate (percentage points). 
 
   MALES  FEMALES 
   mean  sd  N  mean  sd  N 
             
Gender  0.80  4.763  271,934  0.73  4.951  120,211 
             
Age             
16-18  0.74  4.888  5,784  0.52  4.100  2,252 
19-24  0.84  4.946  31,839  0.63  4.670  19,912 
25-29  0.84  4.647  41,497  0.72  4.892  24,380 
30-39  0.76  4.534  88,276  0.71  4.887  38,679 
40-54  0.74  4.697  88,501  0.79  5.007  30,660 
55-64  1.11  6.090  15,409  1.27  6.933  4,158 
             
Region of birth             
North-West  0.46  3.244  63,686  0.48  3.731  34,964 
North-East  0.53  3.736  50,856  0.58  4.129  28,148 
Centre  0.57  3.898  41,873  0.71  4.962  20,363 
South  1.23  6.149  61,020  1.28  6.941  20,564 
Island  1.12  5.851  26,975  0.82  5.292  8,319 
Abroad  1.15  5.677  27,116  0.96  5.621  7,604 
             
Contract             
Permanent  0.81  4.790  226,810  0.81  5.200  88,301 
Seasonal  0.71  5.085  3,067  0.98  6.052  3,253 
Fixed-term  0.82  5.001  17,070  0.47  3.946  14,001 
Training  0.93  4.793  5,927  0.85  5.272  2,731 
Temporary agency  0.72  4.498  3,513  0.65  4.823  1,946 
Apprenticeship  0.61  4.035  15,547  0.35  3.181  9,979 
             
Employment status             
Apprentice  0.61  4.035  15,547  0.35  3.181  9,979 
Blue collar  1.16  5.732  174,390  1.43  6.940  50,577 
Clerk  0.11  1.591  69,295  0.23  2.617  57,522 
Middle management  0.02  0.403  8,755  0.04  0.461  1,717 
Top management  0.01  0.306  3,947  0.00  0.022  416 
             
Monthly wage             
150-800  2.25  10.140  24,492  2.26  10.272  17,085 
801-1,500  1.18  5.209  109,519  0.70  3.749  62,035 
1,5-2,000  0.37  2.186  62,549  0.14  1.257  22,334 
2-3,000  0.14  1.450  46,854  0.06  1.229  12,504 
3-4,000  0.03  0.549  14,213  0.03  0.649  2,955 
4,001+  0.01  0.254  12,225  0.03  0.650  1,440              
Workplace             
North-West  0.57  3.727  89,717  0.55  4.056  43,379 
North-East  0.65  4.225  65,312  0.64  4.322  33,676 
Centre  0.67  4.247  51,829  0.73  5.030  23,773 
South  1.43  6.750  44,779  1.51  7.732  13,821 
Island  1.14  6.033  20,297  0.78  5.344  5,562 
             
Firm size             
0-9  1.10  5.793  49,155  0.57  4.444  24,854 
10-19  1.09  5.575  24,968  0.86  5.378  11,974 
20-199  0.81  4.690  59,146  1.01  5.855  26,025 
200-999  0.51  3.327  25,572  0.69  4.578  10,651 
>=1000  0.35  2.784  31,603  0.45  3.155  11,086 
Total  0.81  4.733  190,444  0.74  4.941  84,590 
             
Sector             
Agricolture  0.64  4.856  512  0.31  3.945  177 
Fishing  0.01  0.100  516  0.00  0.000  35 
Mining  1.48  6.546  925  0.24  2.161  84 
Manufacturing  0.73  4.232  120,501  1.00  5.818  46,544 
Electricity, gas and water  0.04  0.804  4,271  0.00  0.000  625 
Construction  2.03  8.217  32,696  0.24  3.169  1,861 
Wholesale and retail trade  0.47  3.380  35,681  0.50  3.835  21,382 
Hotels and restaurants  0.98  5.761  11,647  1.10  6.099  9,608 
Transportation and warehousing  0.76  4.406  21,774  0.41  3.502  3,156 
Credit intermediation and financial 
transactions  0.40  3.438  29,216  0.48  4.116  18,886 
Real estate and rental; professional, 
scientific and management services  0.21  2.187  2,857  0.25  2.503  1,725 
 
 
Table A.2 Descriptive statistics: yearly working days by contract type. 
 
  mean  sd  N 
Permanent  273.1  79.64  315,111 
Seasonal  117.8  92.88  6,320 
Fixed-term  146.28  108.1  31,071 
Training  226.86  97.22  8,658 
Temporary agency  121.37  99.63  5,459 
Apprenticeship  202.27  111.21  25,526 




 Table A.3 Transition matrix: changes in employment contract. 
 
                       To 
From         
Temporary  Permanent  Tot 
Temporary  5,920  9,546  15,466 
Permanent  7,422  53,808  61,230 
Tot  13,342  63,354  76,696 
 
 